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Abstract
Under certain circumstances, humans tend to
behave in irrational ways, leading to situations in
which they make undesirable choices. The concept of
digital nudging addresses these limitations of bounded
rationality by establishing a libertarian paternalist
alternative to nudge users in virtual environments
towards their own preferential choices. Thereby,
choice architectures are designed to address biases
and heuristics involved in cognitive thinking. As
research on digital nudging has become increasingly
popular in the Information Systems community, an
increasing necessity for ethical guidelines has emerged
around this concept to safeguard its legitimization in
distinction to e.g. persuasion or manipulation.
However, reflecting on ethical debates regarding
digital nudging in academia, we find that current
conceptualizations are scare. This is where on the
basis of existing literature, we provide a
conceptualization of ethical guidelines for the design of
digital nudges, and thereby aim to ensure the
applicability of nudging mechanisms in virtual
environments.

1. Introduction
In recent years, “digital nudging” has become an
important research focus in the information systems
(IS) community (see e.g. [1-4]; [54-61]). Thaler and
Sunstein first conceptualized the idea of nudging as a
form of overt and predictable behavior change in their
work [5]. They state that nudging methods, e.g.
encouraging prosocial behavior, can be surprisingly
effective, while being libertarian, meaning that they
leave people emancipated in their freedom of choice by
not excluding any possible choice, nor introducing
economic incentives to extrinsically alter behavior [5].
Critics argue that nudging is manipulative in that it
undermines people’s autonomy [6], by influencing the
decision-making process and taking advantage of
predictable irrational reactions that result from
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heuristics, biases and psychological mechanisms ([7];
[8-9]). Individuals are susceptible to be influenced in
their decision-making processes as they fall back on
heuristics, biases, and psychological mechanisms [2].
Digital nudging is implemented in virtual
environments to e.g. simplify the information and
option overflow. However, whenever IS design aims to
influence human behavior, IS scholars should also
address ethical concerns ([10-12]). Against this
background, the ethical legitimization of nudging is
controversially discussed in literature.
It is important to discuss and define nudging in
distinction to other regulatory mechanisms such as
manipulation (infringement of autonomy), to better
apprehend the ethical debate on nudging. Due to the
difficulty to distinguish both concepts and the premise
that general ethical abstractions often lead to
insufficient and perplexing results [13], we hereby aim
to concretize the ethical debate on nudging. More
specifically, with the increasing importance of IS at
present, and the increasing use of e.g. artificial
intelligence, it is important to extend the debate on
ethical legitimizations of nudges to the digital context.
Yet, according to Renaud and Zimmermann [14], despite the
growing importance of ethical discussions in IS, research on
ethics is only slowly emerging. With this work, we aim to
contribute by providing ready to use ethical guidelines,
which transfer knowledge derived from definitory and ethical
discussions in (offline) nudging to the online context, in order
to support designers of digital nudges. Thereby, we align
with the differentiated view on ethics and morality as
suggested by Stahl [15] and further discussed by [16]. In
literature, ethics and morality are often used interchangeably
[17-18] and are jointly described as “customs, good practices
or expected behavior” ([19], p. 145). However, the
differentiation between morality, understood as rules or
norms within a society and ethics, conceptualized as the
justification of these morals [15], provides a better
generalizability. Namely, that nudge designers with different
understandings of morality may still follow the same
universal ethical frameworks and therefore collectively find
applicability of our guidelines [19]. Moreover, as part of our
contribution, the guidelines may also provide a standard upon
which designers can be held accountable for.

The paper is structured as follows: in section 2, we
will provide the background and basic understandings
of the nudging concept by emphasizing on ethical
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aspects of nudging in regard to libertarian paternalism
and manipulation. Thereafter, in section 3, we will
present our research design, before we work towards
ethical guidelines in digital contexts, which are derived
from existing literature in section 4. In section 5, we
will present our discussion, followed by a summary
and outlook to future research in section 6.

2. Theoretical background
2.1 Bounded rationality and digital nudging
A short introduction into behavioral science, and
existing cognitive processes guiding human decisionmaking provide a basic understanding of ethical
discourses in nudging. Bounded rationality and the
underlying idea of decision-making heuristics is based
on the assumptions that humans dispose over two
interconnecting cognitive systems: the unreflective
(system 1) and the reflective (system 2) [5; 20].
Humans most regularly use unreflective (automatic)
thinking. It is fast, effortless, relies on cognitive
heuristics, and biases [20-21], and enables individuals
to process multiple thoughts simultaneously. The
reflective system, in contrast, is slow, and effortful as it
comprises conscious and deliberate thinking [20-21].
Here, individuals process information sequentially,
allowing them to critically reflect and analyze the
information. Such ‘bounded rationality’ [20], is the
underlying basis for the concept of nudging.
In this context, a nudge can be defined as “(...) any
aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s
behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any
options or significantly changing their economic
incentives” ([5], p. 6). It is always intended to either
alter a person’s unreflective thinking and consequent
automatic behavior, or trigger the decision-making
processes in the reflective system to guide conscious
decisions, therefore altering choice [5]. Transferred to
the virtual environment, digital nudging emphasizes on
the medium and digital instruments through which
nudges can influence choice architectures. It can be
defined as the “use of user-interface design elements to
guide people’s behavior in digital choice
environments” [12, p. 1] or a “a subtle form of using
design, information and interaction elements to guide
user behavior in digital environments, without
restricting the individual’s freedom of choice” [1, p. 3].
The tools and techniques used in digital nudging affect
the same psychological mechanisms (i.e. biases,
heuristics) as in the offline context. Since digital
interfaces are always created by a choice architect and
do not appear randomly, it is crucial to understand the

design of digital (user) interfaces as the environment
which influences decisions [2].
Zhang and Xu [26] found that transparency and the
attitude towards privacy settings can be improved,
showing the effectiveness of digital privacy nudges in
mobile apps. Similarly, Weinmann et al. [12]
acknowledged that opt-in or op-out default settings
have a big influence on online user behavior. Defaultsetting research further reveals that nudges can (1)
positively influence environmentally sound decisionmaking during [27] or (2) decrease (online)
procrastination behavior in students [28]. More recent
studies on online privacy assessed that the combination
of different claims and supporting arguments is most
promising to nudge an increase in privacy concerns [2].
Meanwhile, providing information about the
incompatibility of goods during the purchasing process
improves the online shopping behavior [29], while
digital nudging may also influence users to reflect on
their own sharing behavior and potentially related
privacy concerns [30].
To this day, digital nudging receives less attention
in enterprise settings, though it has great potential in
working environments [32]. Kretzer and Maedche [3]
pre-defined so-called “social nudges” which targeted a
variety of different effects such as cohesion, business
function, geographical distances, and hierarchy. In an
experimental setting, they were then able to show a
positive effect of their social nudges on the decisionmaking
of
users
(e.g.
enterprise
report
recommendations) [3].

2.2 Regulatory mechanisms and manipulation
The academic discourse on regulatory mechanisms
involves (1) architecture (or code), as an alteration of
the physical or digital environment to make alternative
decisions less appealing, (2) libertarian paternalism, as
a mechanism to positively influence rational decisionmaking, and (3) mandated disclosure (or notice)
entailing the distribution of facts to influence informed
decision-making [33]. While code was the first concept
to emerge [34], it generally entails a manipulative
character as choice architectures are influenced
through sanctions [34] or other forms of governmental
control to influence citizen behavior such as speed
bumps to regulate driving speed [33]. Thereafter,
nudging emerged and addressed decision-making
based on the bounded rationality of humans as a way
of aiding the choice selection of preferential options
within existing choice architectures, rather than
constructing choice architectures in a mandated and
strictly paternalistic way [5]. However, as Thaler and
Sunstein acknowledge the (soft) paternalistic character
of nudges, they emphasize the libertarian aspect of
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nudging (e.g. the option to choose differently as
nudged by authorities) as the distinguishing factor
between nudging and manipulation [33].
A
commonly
used
definition
describes
manipulation as “intentionally causing or encouraging
people to make the decisions one wants them to make,
by actively promoting their (decision-)making (…) in
ways that rational persons would not want to make
their decisions” ([35], p. 33). From our point of view,
this definition likely applies to the idea of code.
Moreover, nudging critics argue that nudging has a
manipulative character [36]. Despite the efforts of
Thaler and Sunstein [5] to legitimize nudging by
distinguishing it from code, there is still continuous
criticism regarding a clear understanding of the
economic incentives or the lack of defined
circumstances for the removal or addition of options
[36]. In line with the criticism, the nudging concept
does not provide a clarification nor do legitimizing
conditions exist to differentiate nudging from
manipulation. In the effort of closing this gap, we will
review existing literature on more detailed approaches
to define nudging and distinguish nudges from
manipulation, before building our ethical guidelines on
the basis thereof.
Hansen [37] draws the conclusion that there are two
possibilities for the definition of a nudge. One being
that nudges pursue paternalistic motives, which
simplifies their ethical legitimization as the motive of
the nudger has to be based on the interests of the
nudgee [37]. The other conceptualizing nudging from a
technical perspective as the effort to influence human
judgement, choice or behavior in predictable ways
where rational decision-making in line with one’s own
preferential choice set falls short to bounded rationality
(e.g. due to cognitive boundaries, biases, routines)
[37]. In consequence, and contrary to Thaler and
Sunstein [5], here nudges (1) exclude relevant choice
options, (2) grant extrinsic incentives, and (3) provide
rational information and arguments [37]. In this
definition, nudges are not necessarily paternalistic,
therefore not always align with the preferences of the
nudgee. Instead, this definition is more suitable for
practical use because it includes both, nudges that have
paternalistic motives as well as third-party interests.
This is where nudging reaches its conceptual
limitations because it is originally not laid out to
include non-libertarian phenomena [38], yet, in reality
many nudges have long been used for such purposes.
According to Grüne-Yanoff [39], it is impossible to
consider all individual nudgee preferences for the
construction of a choice architect. Nudging and
especially digital nudging, always contain some
prejudice towards certain choices. ‘Subconscious’
nudges often reach the biggest effect [7], which

particularly decreases the incentive for designers of
digital nudges to aim at transparent implementations.
Moreover, the implementation of non-transparent
nudges bares one of the most central ethical concerns
and reservations against nudging as transparency is one
of the most important legitimizing conditions for the
distinction between nudging and manipulation [5].
In regard to the ethical debate on nudging, research
has provided a few different perspectives. On the basis
of her conceptual paper on possible aspects
counteracting the side-effects (e.g. distrust) or
autonomy concerns of nudging, Clavien [65] argues
that shared preference justifications (all affected
nudgees agree with the goals pursued by the nudger)
are the most adequate to ensure ethical legitimization
of nudges. Meanwhile, Blumenthal-Darby and
Burroughs [66] focused their work on the identification
of ethically relevant dimensions in form of a list of
considerations that must be acknowledged when choice
architectures are being influenced.
In his analyses of case studies, Engelen [64]
establishes a so-called list of criteria and their
suggested contextual importance, which health
practitioners should consider when nudging their
patients. However, in a response to Engelen [64],
Fowler and Roberts [67] criticize his work and suggest
broadening its perspective to include a wider variety of
cases for analyses, on top of the perspectives of those
affected by the nudges as well as an assessment of the
effectiveness of the implemented nudges. In light of
the existing work on digital nudging and ethics it
becomes apparent that though there have been some
efforts to incorporate ethical standards into nudging, to
this day two aspects are still missing: (1) the evaluation
of ethical standards in digital nudging and (2) the
introduction of ready to use guidelines for the actual
design of nudges. This is also supported by Lembcke et
al. [68] who point out, that an “integration of practical
ethical guidelines into (an) existing framework” is yet
to be done” (p. 13). We agree that the existing body of
knowledge is still lacking a set of guidelines that can
be utilized by designers in order to allow theory to
actually inform practice. That is why our work set out
to provide both aspects, thereby closing this gap.

3. Method
On the basis of the provided definitions and first
aspects to distinguish nudging from manipulation, we
now introduce our literature analysis. We analyzed
literature on regulatory mechanisms, nudging, and
persuasion. We built our methodological approach
based on the framework by vom Brocke et al. [40] and
aligned our literature review with the categorization by
Cooper [41], to assure a justified scope in line with the
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goal and target group (Fig. 1). The goal of our
literature analysis is a thorough representation of the
ethical debate on nudging. Moreover, our goal was to
review other potential concepts to provide a holistic
foundation for the derivation of ethical guidelines. The
selection process was not entirely neutral as we preselected relevant publications, which fit our goal and
aligned with the IS context. With our work we aim to
address scholars in nudging related topics and
designers or practitioners implementing nudges in
virtual environments.
Table 1. Visualization and categorization
approach (Cooper, [41]; vom Brocke et al.,
[40]).
Characteristics
1
focus
2

goal

3

organization
perspective
audience

4
5

6

coverage

Categories
research
outcomes
integration

applications
central
issues
historical
conceptual
methodlogical
neutral representation
espousal of position

specialized
scholars

exhaustive

research
theories
methods
criticism

general
scholars

exhaustive
and
selective

practition
ers/
politician
s
represent
ative

general
public

central/
pivotal

Forward and backward searches on all identified
research articles allowed us to include relevant
literature e.g. on regulatory mechanisms. Hereby we
took a particular interest in publications discussing
ethics and conceptual research methodologies. We
derived our ethical guidelines iteratively by comparing
relevant concepts and frameworks (e.g. [68]).
The process of deriving the ethical guidelines for
the design of nudges is twofold. We first used a
categorization scheme based on the framework as
introduced by Hansen and Jespersen [42],
distinguishing between transparent and non-transparent
nudges in combination with system 1, unreflective and
system 2, reflective thinking. In a second step, we
closely regarded the identified literature to derive our
guidelines in a stepwise approach. Altogether, we used
a descriptive research methodology by casting a light
on a current issue and gradually building on already
existing work. Accordingly, the ethical guidelines we
introduce in the following were developed on the basis
of past work and the idea, that an ethical approach to
the design of nudges should consider transparency and

the cognitive thinking processes of the target audience
as the two starting points of consideration.

4. Results: ethical guidelines for the design
of digital nudges
Our guidelines assist and provide a ready to use checklist, to guide researchers and practitioner in the design
process of nudges. In line with this goal we provide a
universal framework that applies to all digital nudges,
and most importantly for all designers independent of
their occupational or epistemological background.

4.1 Transparency as a legitimizing condition
for nudges
While it seems logical in theory that individuals
always have the freedom to choose differently than
what they are being nudged towards [5], a broad
variety of nudges are not transparent and therefore
non-paternalistic. Consequently, nudging gives
individuals the theoretical option to choose differently,
but practically their behavior is changed in a way that
does not provide options to vary choices.
Given that nudges always have to be transparent
[5], it is crucial to regard transparency in more detail.
Namely, (digital) nudges can be distinguished as
transparent and non-transparent [43]. It is the nontransparent types of nudges that fall under the
manipulation objection as they work subliminally and
are usually not striking to the nudgee [46]. Considering
the unreflective (system 1) and reflective (system 2)
cognitive systems, we recognize that there are different
forms of influence between these two types of nudges.
Since system 1 nudges influence (e.g. simplify)
choices, they can infringe an individual’s autonomy, if
undetected by the nudgee [23]. System 2 nudges alter a
nudgee’s reflective thinking (e.g. habits) [23], possibly
influencing a shift in behaviour (e.g. exclude choice).
However, non-transparent system 1 nudges can only be
legitimate, if preceded by some type of information or
clarification about the nudge. This precondition cannot
apply to non-transparent system 2 nudges, as the
nudger intentionally excludes possible choices, leading
to an intentional and unethical manipulation of the
contextual environment and consequent behaviour.
This concludes that non-transparent nudges have to be
used in a disclosed manner and the nudgees have to be
able to intervene and resist the triggered behavioral
change at all times.
Wilkinson [47] supports this distinguished view of
non-transparent system 1 and 2 nudges by stating that
nudges, which neither qualify as a form of intentional
influence on choice (unreflective system 1) nor inflict
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on or pervert an individual’s decision-making process
and consequent behavior (reflective system 2), can be
considered manipulation. Therefore, under the given
considerations, which we will also further discuss as
“legitimizing conditions”, ethical nudges can either be
transparent or non-transparent (see e.g. Table 3).

4.2 Easy-resistibility as a legitimizing condition
for (non-)transparent nudges
In line with Thaler and Sunstein [5], the original
choice sets of a nudged person are limitless and should
not be inhibited by external factors. Accordingly,
Saghai [48] suggests, that if choice architects are used
to shape choices, users must also be given the option to
resist. Thaler and Sunstein [5] agree by stating that
nudges should be “easy and cheap to avoid” (p. 9).
According to Saghai [48], easy resistibility is
provided, when a nudgee has the ability and chance to
become aware of how the nudge is steering the
individual towards a certain behavior; when a nudgee
has the ability to oppose the triggered behavior or
choice; or when the influence of the nudge is not
undermining the nudgee’s attention-bringing or
inhibitory capacities. We conclude that non-transparent
system 1 nudges can only be legitimate, if easy
resistibility is ensured. Meanwhile, non-transparent
system 2 nudges are excluded from this legitimization
as a nudgee has no ability to oppose influence taking
he or she is unaware of.

4.3 Non-controllability as a legitimizing
condition for (non-)transparent nudges
Moreover, Saghai [48] also states that substantially
non-controlling nudges, shaping the environment
through intentional choice architectures may be
libertarian. This means, that the nudger should not take
any measures to violate the autonomy of the nudgee,
such e.g. incentives or coercion.
The substantial non-controlling condition therefore
protects the nudgee from influences that change the
individual’s perspective in a subliminal or even
manipulative way. However, as it can be argued that
resistibility is a subjective criterion, following the
argument by Faden and Beauchamp [49], Saghai [48]
suggests that objective views of resistibility align with
the perception of the average person. We summarize
that to distinguish digital nudging and (non-libertarian)
manipulation, we first acknowledge prejudices as a
constituent of all decision-making environments,
especially in the digital world.
Further, we acknowledge, that if nudgers construct
choice architectures they have to do so transparently,

include a possibility of resistance, and avoid extrinsic
incentives. This is also expressed by the term “easy
resistibility”, which is often used in the nudging
context. One may hence speak of manipulation when a
non-transparent nudge is implemented without any
preceding information, and is further perceived as an
unwanted, disfavored alteration of decision-making
processes in digital environments. According to our
provided arguments and conditions to distinguish
paternalism from manipulation, Table 2 provides an
overview and categorization scheme of the essential
conditions for legitimate nudges as well as legitimizing
conditions for non-transparent nudges that we derived
from the literature. Further, Table 2 also resembles the
basic frame, on the basis of which we derived our
ethical guidelines in Table 3. Nudge designers need to
be mindful of the public welfare or normative incentive
applying to their target group (Step 1) [69], and use
this knowledge as the basis on which nudging goals
(Step 2) and design principles (Step 3) can be derived,
before their evaluation (Step 4).
Table 2. Summary of ethically legitimizing
conditions of nudges
Essential
conditions
Libertarian
Paternalism

Legitimizing
Conditions
Transparency
System 1: easy
resistibility,
non-controlling
System 2: easy
resistibility,
non-controlling
Non-transparency
System 1:
disclosure, consent,
easy resistibility,
non-controlling
System 2: nudges
are manipulative
and beyond
legitimization

Authors
[43]; [5]; [37]
[42]; [7]; [46]; [50]
[48]
[48]

[50]; [42]; [47]

[51]; [47]; [42]

Hence, we distinguish nudges that affect the
reflective thinking from manipulative nudges that
affect the unreflective thinking, if they are nontransparent or according to [46] remain undetected by
the nudgee. In regards to non-transparent nudges we
are now able to further derive legitimizing conditions
of ethical nudges. Based on existing literature
regarding the basic characteristics of (digital) nudging
as well as the described legitimizing conditions, Table
3 provides ethical guidelines in form of a checklist that
has to be satisfied in order to assure the design of
ethical digital nudges.
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Table 3. Ethical Guidelines for the
Construction of Digital Nudges
Ethical Guidelines for Digital Nudging: A stepwise approach
Step 1: Understand the intentions of potential users and their
cognitive heuristics and biases

the target group has been thoroughly identified
the preferential choice set of your target group has been identified

Step 2: Derive the goals of digital nudging

the goals are in alignment with the users’ preferential
choice set and/ or stem from good intentions. They benefit and do not
harm the user.
the potential impact is predictable

Step 3: Design and implement the nudge
System 1 (Unreflective Thinking) fast, unconscious decision making & parallel/ convergent thinking
Transparent

the choice architecture is
presented in the most
simplified way

Non-transparent

justification for the need for
non-transparency is given

Easy resistibility

the nudge is easy and
cheap to avoid. There are no
costs to avoiding the nudge.

Disclosure

simplified information about
the nudge is provided

Consent

consent forms are provided
requiring users to thoroughly
read & opt-in to the terms and
conditions to ensure informed
consent, or informational nudges
signaling preselected default-settings
are provided, in cases were informed
consent was already established

no incentive/ coercion was
introduced to influence
choice

Easy resistibility

the nudge is easy and
cheap to avoid. There are no
costs to avoiding the nudge.

Non-controlling

no incentive/ coercion was
introduced to influence
choice.

Non-controlling

System 2 (Reflective Thinking) slow, conscious & sequential/ critical thinking
Transparent

the choice architecture is
presented in a simple and
comprehensive way

Easy resistibility

the nudge is easy and cheap
to avoid. There are no costs to
avoiding the nudge.

Non-controlling

no incentive/ coercion was
introduced to influence
choice.

Step 4: Evaluation of the digital nudge and iteration

5. Discussion
As supported by research of [1] and [2], the nudger
has to understand the intentions of potential users and
their heuristics as well as biases in the first step.

Non-transparent

Designing non-transparent digital
system 2 nudges (reflective)
is considered manipulative. Therefore, the
nudge should now be re-considered.

the nudge is consistent with the original goal and useful to influence
the target behavior
there are no unintended negative consequences (e.g.
malicious intent, monetary disadvantages) for the target
group.

This includes acknowledging that the targeted nudgees
may experience both, unreflective and reflective
thinking during their interaction with the nudge and
consequent decision-making process. In the
consecutive second step the nudger can now derive the
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goal a digital nudge aims to achieve. On the basis
thereof the nudger is able to design and implement the
nudge. Hereby, the nudger needs to be aware of the
different cognitive systems his target group fluently
switches in and out of when interacting with the digital
interface.
When implementing transparent digital system 1
nudges (unreflective), automated behavior is being
influenced, making these types of nudges almost
impossible to avoid. Although they appear to be
detectable to the nudgee, they work manipulative in a
technical (not psychological) way. As they are overt
and identifiable, these nudges are ethically justifiable.
Here, the choice architect is held responsible for the
nudging effects because an individual’s automatic
thinking guides the user behavior. If an individual is
nudged against personal preferences, attention bringing
capacities can be activated and deliberate thinking
allows the individual to resist the nudge [48]. If the
goal of a choice architect is to e.g. increase the security
settings during online purchasing, respective security
settings could be nudged in a simplified and accessible
way (e.g. reminders to update settings or increased
visibility of security options) that the nudgee may
automatically feel encouraged to update the privacy
settings.
When designing non-transparent digital system 1
nudges (unreflective) manipulation risks are high, as
they are almost undetectable and influence behavior
subliminally. Thus, it is difficult for the nudgee to
reconstruct the ends and means of the nudge or
perceive all possible options. Hence, choice architects
should always aim to be in line with user interests.
However, as individual user interests may be difficult
to reconstruct for designers, another option is to reveal
the intentions behind the nudge or request the user’s
consent. This would require the nudger to implement at
least one of the following legitimizing conditions:
disclosure of information or asking user consent as a
prerequisite to continue using the website. The
mentioned legitimizing conditions, also known as
informed consent [14] are however not always
prompted, especially given the vastness by which users
move across digital landscapes, oftentimes holding
multiple registrations with different platform providers.
In such cases we acknowledge that a ready-to-use
ethical guideline needs to be aware of the discrepancy
between ethical nudging and providing the least
amount of disruption during a user experience.
Therefore, instead of suggesting to request informed
consent every time a user logs onto a platform, we
suggest that priming or signaling nudges could be
implemented to raise the user’s awareness. This would
qualify for an information box signaling the users that
he was nudged according to the preselected default-

settings that were agreed upon during the initial
registration process on the current platform for
instance.
Designing and implementing transparent digital
system 2 nudges (reflective), entails influencing
choice in a transparent way, by emphasizing choices
consistent with the nudgee’s preferences [42]. This
system of nudges activates reflective thinking, making
it easy to understand the means and ends of the
implemented nudge and giving the nudgee the actual
possibility to make choices without perverting his or
her decision-making process. These nudges are truly
libertarian as they influence individuals without
manipulation or infringement of autonomy. This is in
line with Tocchetto [63] who argues that only
reflective (and transparent) nudges are morally
harmless. Here, the nudger would e.g. use timely
information nudges as triggers reminding the user of
the insufficient security settings or provide additional
information during the user journey on the website to
encourage the nudgee to reflect password or security
choices.
Designing non-transparent digital system 2
nudges (reflective) on the other hand is considered
non-paternalistic and manipulative. Although these
nudges use tools that activate reflective thinking, they
do not allow the nudgee to reconstruct the means and
ends of the implemented nudge. Choices are
manipulated, leading to behavioral change without the
opportunity to choose differently. Here, nudgees would
be forced to update or revisit security settings before
e.g. logging out. Even though this could potentially
increase the overall security settings it would
manipulate user behavior and infringe freedom of
choice.
Finally, the fourth and last step in the design or
implementation of ethical nudges is to evaluate the
nudge and, if necessary, interactively adjust aspects
according to the principles we have provided. This step
will be subject to further research. We used a
heterogenous body of literature as part of our
methodology to derive the ethical guidelines.
Therefore, as a final step, we added the evaluation
and possible iteration of the digital nudge. By doing so
we adapted known evaluation processes as part of IS
research affiliated Design Science Research
methodologies (see e.g. [52]), which provides an
important implication for nudging research and its
constant effort of putting nudging theory into practice.
We view the evaluation phase of the ethical guidelines
as a central final step to assure functional purpose and
target analysis [52] and provide a quality standard as
part of our key practical contribution to establish
ethical nudging design guidelines. Namely, the
evaluation is a reassessment if the results match the
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expectations (steps 1-3) [53]. After we derived and
iteratively improved the ethical guidelines for nudging,
we aim to test and evaluate our guidelines in the future
(e.g. by designers of digital nudges) to provide
legitimization for the use of digital nudges in IS
specific contexts.

6. Conclusion
In this paper, we critically reflected the current
status quo in the ethical discussion on digital nudging.
We expanded on existing research by drawing between
libertarian nudges, non-libertarian nudges and
manipulation. The latter only being present in cases
where non-transparent nudges are implemented in the
attempt to alter people’s decision-making processes
and consequent behaviour in a way they would not
have chosen by themselves, thus violating their
autonomy and freedom of choice.
We conclude, that designers of a choice
architecture have to be able to defend the used
measures, thereby self-checking if their nudge
withstands public scrutiny. Our literature-based
conceptualization of ethical guidelines very well
reflects the status quo of the existing academic
discourse. However, we acknowledge that both,
providing different case scenarios of the application of
our guidelines as well as possibly mapping these to the
structure of a nudging design method, therefore
allowing us to derive an actual research question,
would highlight the applicability of our guidelines and
further improve the contribution to practice. This is
why we will consider both aspects in future research.
As a next step, the guidelines need empirical validation
and discussion with nudgers and nudgees. We hence
suggest implementing and testing our guidelines in a
consecutive research project to expand on the
contribution for practitioners, validate our guidelines,
and provide a concretized call to action for their
enforcent.
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